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Abstract 
 
What impact does party fragmentation have on the likelihood of democracies to run a fiscal 
deficit? Past research is almost unanimous in finding that, as the number of parties in a country’s 
legislature or government grows, so does its probability of overspending. But this finding is 
based largely on parliamentary systems, and there is no reason to believe that it should hold 
when executives are independent. In this article, I develop a theory for the impact of legislative 
fragmentation on budgetary politics in presidential democracies. I argue that unified presidential 
systems should tend most towards fiscal solvency but that increasing fragmentation should 
actually facilitate budget balancing when government is divided. The logic is that presidents, 
who are likely to prefer balanced budgets due to their broad constituencies, will be better able to 
craft acceptable governing coalitions from divided legislatures than from ones controlled by a 
single opposing party. They will also be better able to circumvent such fragmented legislatures 
should a coalition prove impossible. I test these propositions quantitatively in all presidential 
democracies from 1976 to 2007. The results provide support for the theory and highlight the 
contrasting impact of legislative fragmentation on public policy in presidential versus 
parliamentary systems.  
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Why might a democratically elected government choose to run a sustained fiscal deficit in the 
face of a number of potentially serious drawbacks?
1
  Among the strongest findings in political 
economy is that fragmented polities tend to produce larger budget deficits.  A multitude of 
studies have borne out this fragmentation-deficit relationship empirically (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 
1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Kontopoulos and Perotti 
1999).  While these studies have expanded our knowledge about the politics of budget deficits, 
they nearly all have one serious limitation – they ignore the unique dynamics of presidential 
democracy.  Empirically, most analyses of political fragmentation and overspending focus on 
Western Europe, and thus consider few if any presidential systems.  Moreover, although this is 
rarely acknowledged in the literature, the theoretical link between party fragmentation and deficit 
spending implicitly assumes a parliamentary system.  In presidential systems, the executive is 
not drawn from the legislature, and so fragmented assemblies do not translate automatically into 
fragmented governments.  As a result, there are very good reasons to believe that the linear 
relationship between divided legislatures and budget deficits may not hold for presidential 
democracies. 
 In this article, I develop and test a new theory relating governmental and legislative 
fragmentation to deficit spending in presidential systems.  I argue that unified presidential 
governments (where the president and the majority of legislators are from the same party) are 
less likely to engage in deficit spending than divided governments.  The reason is rooted in both 
“policy inertia” and “common pooled resource” logic; unified government empowers the 
president, elected from a national constituency, to rein in spending.  Perhaps more surprisingly, I 
also contend that, when government is divided, increased legislative party fragmentation is 
                                                 
1
 The negative consequences of long-term deficits could include contracted national savings, reduced future incomes 
(Gale and Orszag 2003), long-term current account deficits (Yellen 1989), and the increased risk of capital flight.  
Short-term deficits are not thought to be problematic (e.g. Barro 1979). 
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associated with balanced budgets.  The logic is that, when legislative opposition is more 
fractured, presidents are in a better position to control overspending.  I find support for these 
relationships with a cross-sectional time-series model of all presidential democracies from 1976-
2007 (contingent on data availability).  My findings force a reconsideration of budgetary politics 
in presidential democracies and may have implications for understanding the provision of public 
goods in a wide variety of policy areas.   
 
The Literature: Political Institutions and Deficit Spending 
Most studies relating fiscal profligacy to political fragmentation can be grouped into one 
of two branches in the literature.  The first of these – termed the “policy inertia” branch by 
Tsebelis (2002) – argues that the presence of multiple veto points in the budget-making process 
slows down adjustment to fiscal shocks (e.g. Alesina and Drazen 1991, Alt and Lowry 2000, 
Franzese 2002).  Because no party wants to reduce funding for its constituents, and because 
every party in a governing coalition has the power to veto spending reductions, fragmentation 
should produce larger deficits during hard times.   
The second branch of the literature – the “common pooled resource” branch – generates 
similar predictions but makes a stronger claim about the relationship between fragmentation and 
deficits (Tsebelis 2002).  Scholars in this tradition see government budgets as common pooled 
resources that can confront political actors with intractable collective action problems (eg. 
Roubini and Sachs 1989, Velasco 1997, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Hallerberg 2004).  In 
fragmented systems, the logic goes, each influential party has an incentive to direct as much 
spending as possible to its constituents.  This is because each party internalizes all of the political 
rewards for spending but only part of the political costs of fiscal imbalance, which are shared 
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with its coalition partners.  A prisoner’s dilemma therefore characterizes the budgetary process, 
with no party wanting a budget deficit but each unwilling to relinquish unilaterally the piece of 
the fiscal pie that it has won. Budgetary centralization can help overcome this collective action 
problem by empowering a single individual to put an end to any fiscal free riding.
2
   
 Using one or both of these logics, political scientists and economists have argued that 
budget deficits are more likely in countries with fragmented polities.  For example, many 
scholars identify a relationship between budget deficits and the number of parties in coalition 
governments (Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 
1999, Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999, but see Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery 1996).  Focusing on 
another key form of fragmentation, Volkerink and de Haan (2001) find a link between the 
number of parties in a country’s legislature and the probability that the country will run a budget 
deficit.  Likewise, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) find that minority parliamentary governments are 
more likely to engage in deficit spending, while Volkerink and de Haan (2001) extend that 
argument to governments with very small majorities.    
Of course, political fragmentation can mean something very different in parliamentary 
versus presidential systems.  In parliamentary systems, governments must win the support of a 
majority of legislators to stand.  As a result, party fragmentation in the assembly is normally 
translated into party fragmentation in the government in the form of coalitions.  Likewise, when 
a single party controls the majority of seats in parliament (as is often the case in Westminster 
systems), that lack of fragmentation is normally reflected in single party government.  Moreover, 
party discipline usually tends to empower governments in parliamentary systems (see Huber 
1996); as long as the party leaders who make up the government are in agreement on fiscal 
                                                 
2
 Fiscal contracts are a plausible alternative, but these are likely to be used only under specific circumstances.  See 
Hallerberg 2004. 
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policy, the legislature itself is unlikely to interfere.  For these reasons, relating party 
fragmentation to budgetary outcomes seems quite straightforward in parliamentary systems.  
Legislative fragmentation and coalition fragmentation, while not identical, are closely related 
and can be used as alternate measures of veto players in the budgetary process. 
 The situation in presidential systems can be quite different.  Because legislatures and 
executives are elected separately in such systems, there is no necessary link between party 
fragmentation in assembly and government.  Coalition governments are possible and indeed 
common in both presidential and (especially) semi-presidential systems, but the executive in 
these countries tends to be dominated by a powerful, single party president.  As a result, in 
presidential and semi-presidential democracies, there is good reason to believe that predicting 
budget deficits requires an understanding of both legislative fragmentation and legislative-
executive relations.  The simple link between legislative fragmentation and government 
fragmentation observable in most parliamentary systems is simply absent. 
 How have scholars of political fragmentation and budget deficits dealt with differences 
between presidential and parliamentary systems in the past?  In point of fact, the distinction has 
rarely been addressed theoretically.
3
  The most common practice has been to make the broad 
veto players or common pooled resource argument in studies of both government and legislative 
fragmentation, and to translate that directly into expectations about budget balances.  Such an 
approach makes sense when studying parliamentary systems, where legislative and executive 
power is fused, but it can create problems when applied to presidential democracies.  Measuring 
fragmentation in such systems with the effective number of parties in the legislature ignores the 
existence of a separately elected, single party executive.  On the other hand, considering 
                                                 
3
 A rare exception is Alt and Lowry (2000), who find that in US states (which are “presidential” in structure), 
divided government slows adjustment to fiscal shocks.  Another is Cheibub (2006), who finds that the presidential – 
parliamentary distinction matters for deficits, but that the nature of legislative coalitions does not. 
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presidential systems as having no fragmentation because of their executive institutions 
underrates the importance of their sometimes fractious legislatures. 
 If most of the theory developed in the literature is best suited to understanding 
parliamentary systems, what of the empirical analyses?  Scholars of fragmentation and budgetary 
politics have mostly pooled the two types of systems and simply coded presidential democracies 
based on the fragmentation of their legislatures (e.g. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, 
Volkerink and de Haan 2001) or governments (e.g.  Kontopolous and Perotti 1994, Perotti and 
Kontopolous 2002, Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999, Hallerberg 2004).  To take a prominent 
example, Roubini and Sachs (1989) pool cases from the two systems by coding unified 
presidential systems as identical to single party parliamentary cases and divided presidential 
systems as the same as coalition parliamentary systems.  As already noted, the budgetary process 
is likely to differ significantly across these cases, calling into question such an approach.   
 Why has much of the literature that has pooled presidential and parliamentary systems 
found evidence of a linear link between legislative or governmental fragmentation and budgetary 
outcomes?  Most of these studies use datasets dominated by parliamentary systems, with the 
United States, France, and Finland often the only cases with popularly elected, powerful 
presidents.
4
  It seems possible, therefore, that these results are uncovering a genuine relationship 
between fragmentation and budget deficits in parliamentary systems, which constitute the bulk of 
their datasets.  In addition, even in presidential systems, lower fragmentation manifested in 
unified government should be associated with balance budgets, but, as I argue here, that is far 
from the whole story. 
                                                 
4
 And note that the president does not tend to be a dominant player in the budgetary process in France and, 
especially, Finland.  As discussed below, semi-presidential systems such as these are not included in my empirical 
analysis. 
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 While scholars have not fully examined the link between political fragmentation and 
budget deficits in presidential systems, some have sought to explain overspending in these 
systems with other institutional variables.  For example, Franzese (2002) and Cheibub (2006) 
argue that presidential democracy itself makes states less prone to deficit spending than 
parliamentary democracy because it empowers an executive with a national constituency and 
clear responsibility for budgetary decisions.  Persson and Tabellini (2003), however, find that the 
presidential / parliamentary distinction has no impact.  In a similar vein, Hallerberg and Marier 
(2004) show that, in Latin American presidential systems, a strong executive is necessary to tame 
legislative spending when party and electoral rules provide an “incentive to cultivate a personal 
vote”.5  Finally, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) find a weak relationship between district 
magnitude and budget deficits in Latin American presidential systems. 
 Research into the political determinants of other economic policies has also addressed 
legislative-executive relations in presidential systems.  For example, O’Halloran (1994) has 
associated unified presidential government with free trade policies, although this argument has 
more recently been challenged by Karol (2000).  Nooruddin (2011) has found evidence that 
divided presidentialism (in contrast to coalition parliamentarism) can impede the stability of 
economic growth.  And closer to our area of concern, Lienert (1997) has examined the cross-
national relationship between presidentialism and legislative power over the budget.   Numerous 
scholars have also identified the detrimental effects of divided presidential government for 
legislative-executive cooperation and public goods provision in specific national and regional 
contexts (e.g. Jones 1995, González and Gillespie 1994). 
 To summarize, most of the budget literature pools presidential and parliamentary 
democracies, leaving budgetary politics within presidential systems seriously understudied.  To 
                                                 
5
 This concept was developed and measured by Carey and Shugart 1995. 
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the extent that presidential systems are specifically considered in the budget literature, it is 
almost always to contrast these systems with parliamentary systems rather than to examine the 
internal dynamics of presidential government.  Further, while a few scholars have produced clear 
arguments about the effects of divided versus unified presidential systems in public goods 
provision, even here there is little attention to the effects that legislative fragmentation might 
have on policy outcomes.  In the next section, therefore, I will seek to develop a comprehensive 
theory of budgetary politics in presidential democracies that will plug this hole in the literature. 
 
Theory 
 Before launching into developing my theory, it is useful to define the terms and to 
identify the assumptions that I will be using in this paper.  Following Cheibub (2007), I define a 
system as pure presidential if (1) the president cannot be removed by the legislature and, (2) the 
government is responsible to the president.  The assembly is also unable to remove the president 
in a semi-presidential system, but in such systems the government is responsible to both 
president and assembly.  Finally, in a parliamentary system, the assembly is empowered to 
remove the government. 
 Typically, presidents are either popularly elected or elected by a representative electoral 
college.  However, in some counties they are elected by the assembly, which is then unable to 
remove them from office (except through impeachment).  Because the assembly’s powerlessness 
to bring down the government is the key characteristic of presidentialism, I follow Cheibub 
(2007) by classifying such systems as presidential and including them in my analysis.  However, 
I do not consider semi-presidential systems in this article.  While the budgetary dynamics found 
in semi-presidential systems will likely differ from those found in parliamentary systems, the 
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presence of a government drawn from the assembly distinguishes these systems significantly 
from pure presidentialism.  As I result, I am not convinced that my theory will describe their 
behavior accurately.  Finally, I make the assumption that budgetary approval requires the assent 
of fifty percent of the legislature.  While presidents in different countries have differing authority 
over the budgetary process, as we will discuss later, legislative approval is generally required 
(see Wehner 2006).   
 I develop here a theory relating political fragmentation to budget deficits that is specific 
to the context of presidential democracies.  In doing so, I take into account both elements of 
fragmentation that can be important in such systems – the relationship between the legislature 
and the executive and the partisan composition of the assembly.  My argument is that both of 
these components must be considered in order to develop a truly comprehensive understanding 
of how political differences affect spending decisions in presidential democracies. 
 Beginning with the relationship between presidents and assemblies, I argue that unified 
governments will generally be better able to balance their budgets than divided governments.  A 
unified government, of course, is one where the presidency and the majority of seats in the 
assembly are both held by the same political party, and a divided government is one where either 
a different party or no party holds the majority.  Why should unified government encourage 
balanced budgets?  The reasons are rooted in both the “policy inertia” and “common pooled 
resource” branches of the deficit literature.  Unified government should overcome the policy 
inertia that may delay fiscal adjustment by reducing the effective number of veto players with 
influence over the budget.  When a single party dominates both the executive and legislative 
branches, fewer actors are able to veto any spending reductions that may be compelled by 
exogenous shocks. 
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 Moreover, unified government should reduce the common pooled resource problem that 
is at the heart of fiscal profligacy.  Overspending may benefit certain locales within a country, 
but the budget deficits that it can produce threaten national economic well-being.  Presidents, 
more than legislators, have incentives to promote balanced budgets because of their national 
constituencies.  While presidents may support allocating government spending to social groups 
that support their parties, their concern for broader public goods is likely to be stronger than 
those of legislators, who must answer to their local constituents.   
This greater concern for fiscal balances is likely to be true of presidents generally, but it 
is only when government is unified that they will also have the political power necessary to 
impose their preferences on the assembly.  When a president is the senior member of the party 
controlling the legislature, she can use her influence to rein in unreasonable spending requests 
from co-partisan lawmakers.  As a result, I expect that unified presidential governments will 
have smaller budget deficits (or larger surpluses) than divided presidential governments, other 
things equal.   
 What, then, should be the impact of legislative fragmentation on budgetary outcomes in 
presidential democracies?  When government is unified, I argue, legislative fragmentation is 
unlikely to matter very much.  If the president’s party controls the majority of seats in the 
assembly, whether the remaining seats are held by one party or one hundred parties should not be 
terribly important.  As long as majority control is all that is necessary to dominant the budget 
process, which is generally but not universally true, crossing that 50% threshold should be the 
key factor. 
 The calculation changes, however, when the president’s party fails to reach that 
threshold.  When government is divided, the president and her party must reach out to other 
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parties to gain the votes necessary to approve the state budget.  Under these conditions, therefore, 
the partisan structure of the opposition can matter quite significantly.  But how does it matter? 
 I argue here that, contrary to what one might expect, increased legislative fragmentation 
under conditions of divided presidential government will contribute to balanced budgets.  In 
other words, when government is divided, fragmentation in presidential systems will tend to 
have the opposite impact on deficit spending as it seems to in parliamentary systems.  Of course, 
fiscal responsibility is most likely to obtain when presidential governments are unified, but, 
when the two branches are controlled by different parties, it is better for the legislature to be 
fragmented.  This seemingly paradoxical argument stems from the observation that presidential 
influence over the budget process is likely to be maximized when the opposition is divided rather 
than when it is centered in a single party.  Because, as discussed above, presidents should (other 
things equal) value fiscal responsibility more highly than legislators, and because the reduced 
power of opposition parties reduces the number of veto players impeding policy change, this 
empowerment should contribute to balanced budgets. 
 Why do fragmented legislatures contribute to the influence of presidents, and therefore 
more balanced budgets, when government is divided?  First, when there are multiple opposition 
parties, it tends to be easier for presidents to form coalition governments with policy buy-in.  In 
pure presidential systems, of course, governments are responsible only to the president.  
Frequently, however, presidents choose to form coalition governments in order to curry the 
legislative support that they need for their initiatives.  These coalition presidential governments 
are most commonly observed when legislative fragmentation is high (see Cheibub 2007). 
To see why, imagine a president’s task in forming a government when a single party 
forms the opposition.  In such a circumstance, it is unlikely that the opposition party, which 
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controls the assembly and is likely biding its time to make a bid for the presidency, will agree to 
join or even support the government.  All of the party’s incentives point it towards acting as a 
spoiler for the government.  By contrast, when the opposition is made up of a multitude of 
smaller parties, it should be significantly easier for the president to entice some into a coalition.  
Some of these parties may have similar policy preferences to the president’s party, and, 
moreover, they have much less to gain by opposing the president in the legislature.  Smaller 
parties are likely to find real policy influence and government portfolios too tempting to resist. 
Why, then, should a president’s ability to entice minority parties into her coalition 
contribute to fiscal responsibility?  When the alternative is divided and minority government, 
coalition government has a number of advantages for the budgetary process.  Most especially, 
non-presidential parties, by associating themselves with the government, expose themselves to 
popular approbation if their fiscal profligacy should damage the economy.  In exchange for 
access to power, they also recognize to some extent the leadership of the president and surrender 
the freedom to publicly criticize her.  As a result, when the budget comes up for legislative 
approval, they may have little choice but to support it.  That may be the reason that Edin and 
Ohlsson (1991) find that, in parliamentary systems, minority governments are the most likely of 
all to engage in overspending. 
Of course, non-presidential parties that hold portfolios can seek to direct public resources 
to their constituencies during the formation of the budget, and no doubt they often do.  There is 
also the possibility that parties may threaten to leave the president’s coalition (or not to join it in 
the first place) if not given favorable fiscal terms.  Such behavior, however, is unlikely to result 
in fiscal profligacy to the degree that would obtain under low fragmentation divided government.  
One way to see this is to imagine the opposition party’s leverage in market terms; threats of 
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leaving the coalition will likely produce some fiscal success for an opposition party under high 
fragmentation divided government, increasing the chances of large deficits from what we would 
see in a unified system.  That said, the party’s threat to exit the cabinet will lack the credibility of 
a threat made by a much larger opposition party in a system of low fragmentation.  This is 
because the party leaders will understand that if they push too hard for fiscal benefits, the 
president can replace them in the cabinet with another party.  They would then lose the benefits 
of controlling a portfolio and would become one of many opposition parties in the legislature.  
By contrast, large opposition parties under low fragmentation divided government are 
indispensable; their support must be obtained to move the legislative agenda forward.  As a 
result, whether they join the president’s coalition or not, such parties have more power to 
demand fiscal benefits for their constituents.   
For similar reasons, a fragmented legislature and divided opposition can strengthen the 
president’s hand in the budget process even when she does not successfully seek coalition 
partners.  When government is divided and one or two major opposition parties control the 
majority of seats in the assembly, a president will be left with no alternative but to placate their 
fiscal demands.  The budget process will therefore no longer be dominated by a single executive 
with a national constituency who internalizes politically the dangers of overspending.  However, 
when opposition is divided among multiple parties, a president can adopt some additional 
strategies to gain legislative approval of the budget.  First and foremost, when the president 
enjoys the right to propose the budget, as is frequently the case, a divided legislative will allow 
her more options about where to set the terms of the debate.  This is because there are more 
possible legislative coalitions that could be formed to support the proposal.  As a result, when 
faced with a divided legislature, a president can strategically propose the budget to produce an 
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outcome that will minimally deviate from her preferences.  Not only that, but a divided 
opposition should facilitate the president’s use of her constitutional powers.  In other words, an 
opposition made up of multiple disputing parties is unlikely to interfere effectively with a 
president’s use of agenda setting and decree powers (see Carey and Shugart 1998).  By contrast, 
when a single opposition party controls the legislature, the president is faced with fewer options 
(assuming that party discipline holds).  Presidents can also play smaller opposition parties 
against one another to achieve preferred outcomes and to keep the budget in check.  Again, a 
useful analogy may be a market system; the greater the supply of parties that can be cobbled 
together to form a legislative coalition, the lower the cost in private goods necessary to purchase 
each party’s support.  Of course, more parties that must be placated mean a wider variety of 
fiscal demands, and unified government is the most likely institutional configuration to promote 
balanced budgets.  When government is divided, however, divide-and-conquer tactics from the 
president can strengthen her hand in a fragmented legislature. 
As noted above, my argument for the impact of unified and divided government on 
budgetary outcomes in presidential democracy gels with most of the extent literature.  My 
expectations concerning the influence of legislative fragmentation on budgetary outcomes under 
conditions of divided government, however, may seem more puzzling.  Linz (1990) and others 
have long argued that the presidentialism is dangerous for the survival of democracy.  Moreover, 
Mainwaring (1993) has identified the combination of presidentialism and multipartism as 
especially noxious for the stability of emerging democracies.  He fears that fragmented 
legislatures, lacking the incentives for compromise that government formation creates in 
parliamentary systems, will lead to gridlock and democratic collapse.  Mainwaring would agree 
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on the beneficial effects of unified government, but he cautions against the very condition that I 
find helpful for budget balances under divided government, namely multiparty legislatures.
6
   
How can we explain these seemingly contradictory findings?  Mainwaring argues that 
multipartism impedes compromise in presidential systems, threatening their durability.  This 
argument is broadly compatible with mine, insofar as I draw a connection between unified 
presidential government, which will be more common under two-party systems, and balanced 
budgets.  We part company, however, when I argue that fragmentation contributes to balanced 
budgets (and perhaps public goods provision more broadly) when government is already divided.  
To put the issue differently, Mainwaring draws an essentially linear connection between 
fragmentation and negative outcomes, while I draw a non-linear connection.  
My point is that, under the less-than-ideal conditions of divided government, presidential 
authority will be greater when the opposition is fragmented.  In a sense, this authority will 
contribute to more compromise between the executive and the assembly, as it provides small 
opposition parties more incentives to follow the president’s agenda.  But it also makes it easier 
for the president to roll over opposition parties should that become necessary.  To the extent, 
then, that presidents represent the national interest, a fragmented opposition is better than a 
unified opposition under divided government. 
That said, it is possible to overstate the differences between my argument and that of 
Mainwaring.  He is considering a related but distinct dependent variable from mine – that of 
regime durability.  It may well be that the same institutions that allow presidents to dominate the 
assembly also impede the fair representation of relevant interest groups within society.  Such a 
situation might ultimately weaken the legitimacy of a regime, even as it makes its policy-making 
                                                 
6
 Note, however, that Cheibub 2007 contests the view that gridlock and other structural flaws in presidential systems 
contribute to their greater rate of democratic collapse. 
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more efficient.  Of course, this logic is somewhat different from the one that Mainwaring relies 
on in his argument, but it is hinted at by Linz in his discussion of the dangers of majoritarianism.   
Other findings in the literature bear more directly on the question of public goods 
provision in presidential systems.  Mainwaring also argues elsewhere (1999) that fragmented 
legislatures in Brazil impeded economic reform.  On a similar note, and in the piece perhaps 
closest to addressing my question here, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) find that increased 
district magnitude, associated with multiparty legislatures, contributes to budget deficits in 
presidential systems.  In these cases, I suspect that that the findings are driven by the benefits of 
unified government over divided government, which I do not question.  As noted above, the 
effects of party fragmentation under divided government have never been independently tested, 
and that is one of my primary goals here. 
 
Conditions and Caveats of the Argument 
 The logic of my argument assumes that both legislatures on the one hand and political 
parties on the other are strong enough to mean something in the budgetary process.  To begin 
with the first of these issues, presidents in different systems can have wildly contrasting powers 
vis-à-vis legislatures over policy and the budget process (Shugart and Carey 1992).  Scholars of 
the fiscal process have already demonstrated the importance of executive power for budgetary 
outcomes in parliamentary systems.  Taking as their starting point the policy inertia or common 
pooled resource logics, these political economists have found evidence that budget deficits are 
higher when there are more spending ministers in a country’s cabinet (Kontopoulos and Perotti 
1999, Volkerink and de Haan 2001) and when finance ministers are weak (Hahm, Kamlet, and 
Mowery 1996).   
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Among presidential democracies, the role of the president in the fiscal process can also 
have important implications for budgetary outcomes.  In some countries, for example, presidents 
have the sole authority to present the budget, while in others that responsibility resides with the 
assembly.  In some countries, the president’s status quo preference becomes law unless the 
assembly actively objects, while in others the president’s primary budgetary power is the veto 
pen (Wehner 2006).  To take a specific example of how presidential powers might matter for 
budgetary outcomes, Baldez and Carey (1999) have shown that in Chile, where the legacy of 
authoritarianism has left the president with unusually wide-ranging powers, budgets are 
generally balanced.  As one would expect, the dominance of a president who internalizes the 
costs of fiscal irresponsibility has allowed Chile to avoid deficit spending.   
The bottom line for our purposes is that when national constitutions endow presidents 
with significant decree powers, the importance of legislative structure is diminished.  Because 
legislative fragmentation only matters to the extent that legislatures matter, my argument makes 
less sense in countries where the budgetary process is dominated by powerful presidents.  As a 
result, I use two separate indices to control for presidential versus legislative budgetary powers.  
I also estimate a model considering only those countries with a modicum of legislative power. 
A second important condition of my argument concerns the strength and centralization of 
party institutions.  As Hallerberg and Marier (2004) have convincingly shown, party 
centralization can substitute for executive power in centralizing decision-making in the hands of 
party leaders with national constituencies.  It should therefore be associated with balanced 
budgets and surpluses.  Moreover, the importance of unified government, central to my theory, is 
at least partially dependent on the existence of party discipline.  If parties are mere paper tigers, 
unified government will not truly strengthen the hand of the president.  As a result, the impact of 
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unified government is likely to be less in weak party systems such as Brazil than in strong party 
systems such as Chile (see Mainwaring 1999).  Not only that, but when party organizations are 
less able to exercise discipline over legislators, the concept of partisan fragmentation has less 
meaning.  As I result, I control for party decentralization in my primary models, and I also 
estimate a model that considers only those country-years where parties are centralized. 
My argument only represents tendencies of cause and effect generally observable across 
cases and must depend on a very clear assumption of “other things equal”.  In addition to the two 
conditions discussed above, there are two other potentially confounding factors that are not 
considered in the theory but that will be controlled for in the empirical model. 
 My argument focuses on legislative-executive relations and party fragmentation, but does 
not consider the ideological distance between parties.  In other words, I am concerned with the 
number of parties but not with their relative placement along the ideological spectrum.  I take 
this focus primarily for practical reasons and for parsimony; the impact of ideological space can 
be quite complex and would be difficult to include in an empirical model (see Cheibub 2007).
7
  
However, I do make an effort to control for partisan ideology in my empirical model, discussed 
below. 
 A second caveat relates to the varying electoral systems of presidential democracies.  
Some scholars, especially in the trade literature, have suggested that electoral constituency size is 
the key determinant of public goods provision.  For example, Rogowski (1987) argues that 
democracies that depend on open trade will tend to combine parliamentary systems with large, 
proportional electoral districts.  The logic is that, when legislative constituencies are large, the 
preferences of representatives will tend more towards the public interest, ensuring that trade 
                                                 
7
 Krause (2000) analyzes ideological differences within and across parties in the US case, and finds that these 
differences are a predictor of budget deficits.  Such an approach is powerful but would be very difficult to execute in 
a cross-national context. 
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remains open.  Providing potential support for this logic, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) and 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) find an association between proportional representation and 
balanced budgets.   
Constituency size and legislative fragmentation are associated with one another through 
their common relationship with electoral district magnitude.  Countries with large district 
magnitudes, a measure of the number of representatives elected from each constituency, will 
tend to have both more parties and larger electoral districts.  As a result, to ensure that legislative 
fragmentation and not electoral district size is explaining deficit spending, I include a variable 
measuring electoral system in the empirical models. 
 
Data and Methods 
 I test my argument with a broad dataset that includes all presidential democracies from 
1976 to the 2007.
8
  Country-years are included in the model when states have a Polity score 
greater than “5”, indicating that they are democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2007), and when 
they are coded as presidential (or as assembly-elected presidential) using the “system” variable 
developed by Beck et al. (2001).  My presidential models consider between 345 and 636 
observations – 47 countries for an average of 13 years each for the primary model.9   
Examining all presidential democracies for which data are available, and across a 
reasonably wide swath of time, is, I believe, an important empirical contribution to the literature.  
Most studies of the political economy of deficit spending have focused on the OECD countries, a 
group consisting primarily of rich democracies with parliamentary institutions.
10
  Those few that 
                                                 
8
 Data and replication instructions are available upon request from the author. 
9
 While the observations included in the models are restricted due to data availability, the number of observations 
included is actually quite comprehensive considering that only presidential democracies are analyzed. 
10
 An important exception is Persson and Tabellini 2003. 
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have considered presidential democracies have looked almost invariably to Latin America, 
excluding such systems in Africa and elsewhere (e.g. Hallerberg and Marier 2004).  My broader 
empirical examination provides a more extensive test of the generalizability of my theory than 
would a more geographically limited study.  It also allows me the opportunity to say something 
preliminary about the global relevance of other explanations common in the literature.  I list the 
country-years included in my primary model (Model 1) in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 
 For my dependent variable, I make use of each country’s total national budget balance 
divided by its gross domestic product (GDP) and multiplied by one hundred.  A positive budget 
balance is of course a surplus, and a negative balance a deficit.  In order to maximize the number 
of observations available, I begin coding the variable using World Bank (2008) budget balance 
data in current local currency units, and then, when observations are missing, supplement the 
variable with data from IMF (2011) and finally with data from IMF (2006).  I then standardize 
the raw budget balance data by dividing it by GDP in current local currency units for each 
country-year (also from World Bank 2008).  In estimating my models, I drop the small number 
of observations where a country’s budget deficit or surplus exceeds 20% of GDP.  These outliers 
reflect either flaws in the source data or countries in unusual economic circumstances (whether 
crises or booms).  Note that, for robustness, I also run my models with the budget balance data 
used by Cheibub (2006), which draws exclusively from the World Bank and is thus coded for 
fewer country-years.   
Because the theory predicts that increased party fragmentation should improve budget 
balances in presidential democracies only when government is divided, my primary independent 
variable is interactive.  I operationalize this interaction in three distinct ways. For ease of 
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interpretation, I use two dummy variables for the primary models, each taken from Beck et al. 
(2001); the first (Divided Government High Fractionalization) is coded “1” when the 
government is divided and the lower house of the legislature is highly fragmented, and the 
second (Unified Government) is coded “1” when government is unified.  The reference category, 
then, in made up of systems with divided government and low legislative fragmentation.  My 
expectation, of course, is that both Divided Government High Fractionalization and Unified 
Government will have a positive and significant impact on budget balance vis-à-vis divided, low 
fragmentation systems. 
I operationalize the Unified Government variable, which I also use to help code Divided 
Government High Fractionalization, with the “allhouse” variable from Beck et al. (2001), which 
is itself coded “1” when the party of the executive controls all relevant houses of the legislature.  
While my argument has focused primarily on the lower legislative house, presidential party 
control in a powerful upper house could impact budget balances in unpredictable ways.  The 
“allhouse” variable allows me to consider the role of fragmentation in purely divided systems.  
To operationalize high fragmentation, I make use of the “frac” variable from Beck et al. (2001), 
which is coded as the probability that any two randomly drawn legislators from the lower house 
come from different parties (a concept called legislative fractionalization).  For that reason, a 
single party legislature would receive a “frac” score of “0”, while a legislature where every 
member belonged to a different party would be coded “1”.  I select .667 as my cut-off point 
because it translates into a system with three or more “effective parties” (see Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979).   
For robustness, I also use data from Henisz (2003) to generate dummy variables 
equivalent to those above.  Because the Henisz (2003) data do not contain an indicator of unified 
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government identical to the Beck et al. (2001) “allhouse” variable, I generate my own – Unified 
Government 2.  I set this variable equal to “1” when the Henisz (2003) variables “Align E_L1” 
and “Align E_L2” indicate that the party of the executive controls both the lower and upper 
houses of the legislature.  If the variable “L2” indicates that a country’s upper house lacks power, 
I consider only executive alignment with the lower house in coding the variable.  I then create 
Divided Government High Fractionalization 2 using this new variable and the Henisz (2003) 
legislative fractionalization variable “Legfra Lower”.  Note that Divided Government High 
Fractionalization 2 and Divided Government High Fractionalization correlate at the relatively 
low level of .436, and so if the results are robust to both operationalizations, it will be strong 
evidence for my theory.
11
 
My final approach to operationalizing the primary independent variables is to use a full 
interaction term.  The advantage of this approach is that it allows for a more complete modeling 
of the conditional effect of each component of the interaction at different levels of the other 
component.  The drawback is that this approach can be harder to interpret; to remedy that 
problem, I have included graphical representations of the results of my interactive model.  To 
measure the first component of the interaction term, I make use of Unified Government, as 
described above.  For the second component, I employ Legislative Fractionalization, the “frac” 
variable from Beck et al. (2001), to operationalize legislative party fragmentation in the lower 
house. 
In addition to these primary independent variables, I include a series of political control 
variables in the models to address each of the two conditions and two caveats discussed in the 
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 Note that the “Align E_L1” and “Align E_L2” are coded “1” when the party of the executive holds the majority in 
the chamber and (unlike with “allhouse”) when it is a member of the ruling coalition in that chamber.  This 
difference likely helps account for the relative low correlation between the variables calculated from Beck et al. 
(2001) and Henisz (2003). 
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previous section.  First, I operationalize party decentralization as the “ballot” variable introduced 
by Carey and Shugart (1995) to explain a legislator’s “incentive to cultivate a personal vote.” My 
variable Party Decentralization is coded “2” when party leaders have almost no control over 
ballot access (as in, for example, primary systems), “1” when they enjoy control over ballot 
access but voters can reorder the electoral list (as in, for example, open list systems), and “0” 
when they exercise almost complete control over nomination. I code my party decentralization 
variable across countries (all democracies) and years (1975-2005), and I expect it to be 
negatively associated with budget surpluses.
12
 
In order to operationalize the constitutional budgetary authority enjoyed by presidents 
versus legislatures, I borrow the presidential dominance (Presidential Dominance) variable 
developed by Cheibub (2006) and the legislative budgetary powers (Legislative Budgetary 
Powers) variable developed by Wehner (2010).  The Cheibub variable is a dummy coded “1” 
when presidents dominate the budgetary process; this situation obtains, for example, when 
presidents initiate the budget and legislatures have limited amendment power.  The Wehner 
variable ranges from “0” to “1” and measures the extent to which legislatures have influence 
over the budgetary process.  Legislatures at the weak extreme, coded “0”, are only able to take an 
up or down vote on an executive proposed budget; those at the other extreme, coded “1”, have no 
significant limitations on their budgetary role. As both variables are only available for a portion 
of the country-years included in my model, I estimate my primary models without them and 
include them in separate robustness tests.  Because stronger presidents can overcome the 
common pooled resource problem of budgetary politics, I expect the Presidential Dominance 
variable to be positively related to surpluses and the Legislative Budgetary Power variable to be 
negatively related to surpluses. 
                                                 
12
 The coding procedure is described in Hankla 2006. 
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 To control for a country’s electoral system, I include in the analysis a dummy variable 
(Plurality Electoral System) coded “1” for plurality systems in the lower house and taken from 
Beck et al. (2001). Finally, to test for the importance of ideology on deficit outcome, I include a 
dummy variable coded “1” in the presence of a leftist governing party (Leftist Government), also 
taken from Beck et al. (2001).   
Beyond these four independent variables included to address my theoretical conditions 
and caveats, I make use of one additional political control.  To test for the presence of a political-
business cycle in deficit spending, I introduce a variable coded “1” if an election occurs in that 
year (Election Year), using data from Beck et al. (2001).  If governments are spending more to 
reduce unemployment and improve growth immediately prior to elections, we would expect 
them to tighten their belts immediately afterwards.  As this variable is lagged, it measures the 
impact of having an election in one year on the following year’s finances; we would therefore 
expect it to be positive and significant.   
 I also include in the analysis a series of economic variables.  I control for a country’s 
development status with its logged GDP per capita (Logged GDP per capita) and for its potential 
welfare burden with the percentage of its population over 64 years old (Pop over 64).  Richer 
countries should have more balanced budgets, other things equal, while countries with older 
populations may overspend.  Further, I use a variable measuring each country’s annual 
percentage change in GDP to control for economic shocks (Δ GDP).  Governments may feel the 
need to run fiscal imbalances during economic crises to stimulate their economies.  I also include 
in the model annual percentage change in each country’s exchange rate with the United States 
dollar (Δ Exchange Rate).  A stronger currency should make government purchasing cheaper, 
potentially improving budget balances, and it may also be an indicator of tighter fiscal policies.  
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At the same time, however, a weaker currency may reduce a country’s debt burden.  Finally, to 
control for the government’s role in the national economy, I employ a variable measuring the 
percentage of a country’s GDP taken up by government consumption (Govt Consumption / 
GDP).  This variable is likely to be negatively related to surpluses because larger governments 
have greater potential to overspend in significant amounts.  Data for all of these variables are 
taken from World Bank (2008).  I lag all of my independent variables and summarize their 
characteristics and their expected relationships with budget surplus in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 
Given the nature of my data, I estimate my models using OLS regression with panel 
corrected standard errors, a lagged dependent variable, and dummy variables for world regions.  
The panel corrected standard errors approach allows me to leverage the robustness of OLS 
regression while taking the country panels in the data into consideration in the computation of 
my standard errors.  The lagged dependent variable deals with the first-order autocorrelation in 
the models, and is the approach recommended by Beck and Katz (1995), while the region 
dummies control for cultural and learning factors that may prevail in different parts of the world.  
Note that there is no need to difference the dependent variable because it is stationary for the 
large proportion of country panels, as evidenced by a Fisher unit root test (xtfisher in Stata).
13
 
Another approach – fixed effects regression – reduces omitted variable bias by including 
country dummies, but it also washes out much of my interesting variation by focusing on within 
country, cross-temporal variation at the expense of cross-national variation.
14
  For robustness, I 
also estimate my models using this approach.  Finally, I make use of “robust regression” (rreg in 
Stata) to control for the effects of the many outliers and extreme values in my dataset.  This 
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 See Maddala and Wu 1999.  This approach allows me to test for a unit root in my unbalanced panel data, unlike a 
traditional Dickey-Fuller test. 
14
 For more on fixed effects models, see Green 2007. 
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approach calculates Cook’s D, a statistic which measures the influence of each observation on 
the results, and then iteratively corrects for the most influential observations by weighting or 
even dropping them from the model.  If my results hold up to robust regression, it will provide 
strong evidence that they are not driven by a small number of influential country-years. 
 
Results 
My primary model, the first model in Table 3, provides strong support for the theory.  
Both Divided Government High Fractionalization and Unified Government are in the expected 
direction and significant at the 1% level, indicating that, in presidential systems, unified 
government and divided government with a fragmented legislature are better for fiscal solvency 
than divided government with a more unified legislative opposition.  The coefficients suggest 
that a move from divided government with low fragmentation either to unified government or to 
a more fragmented legislature will tend to improve the budget balance by nearly one percentage 
point, an important effect.  Note also that the predicted effect of moving to unified government 
or to divided government with a fragmented legislature is roughly the same, indicating that both 
alternate institutional configurations provide about the same potential benefit to government 
finances.   
Insert Table 3 
These results are largely echoed by the remaining models presented in Table 3.  Model 2, 
which estimates the primary model using robust regression to reduce the power of influential 
observations, produces only slightly weaker and still highly significant results for the primary 
independent variables.  The coefficient for Unified Government in Model 3, which uses the fixed 
effects estimator, remains statistically significant in the expected direction, while the coefficient 
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for Divided Government High Fractionalization is just shy of a standard level of significance 
(p=.129).  Given that the fixed effects estimator considers only the less notable within-country 
variation in the independent variables, a weakening of the results is not surprising.  That said, the 
continuing significance of one of the two dummies, and the near significance of the other 
suggests that the results of the primary model are not merely a function of omitted variable bias. 
Model 4 uses an interactive variable to estimate more fully the relationship between 
unified government, legislative fractionalization, and the budget.  The conditional impact of 
unified government and party fractionalization on budget surpluses is most clearly seen in 
Figures 1 and 2, both of which are computed from this model.  Figure 1 shows the effect of 
unified government on budget surpluses at different levels of legislative fractionalization.  The 
solid line represents the estimated effect and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals.  
The figure shows that unified government, as expected, has a significantly positive impact on 
surpluses until about 0.65 fractionalization, at which point the effect becomes insignificant.  Why 
does the effect of unified government decline and eventually lapse into insignificance when 
legislative fractionalization is high?  One possible explanation points to the fact that there are 
few observations in which government is unified and legislative fractionalization is high.  Such a 
confluence would require a minority opposition of numerous small parties, and there are 
probably not enough observations to estimate the impact of unified government under these rare 
conditions.   
 Another possible explanation, supported by the results above, is that, when legislative 
fractionalization is high enough, it is equally good for the fiscal balance to have divided 
government as to have unified government.  In other words, the benefits of a highly divided 
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opposition may be so great that the president can control the budgetary process as effectively as 
if government were unified.   
Insert Figure 1 
 Figure 2 shows the flip side of the interactive term – the effect of a one unit change in 
legislative fractionalization when government is unified and when it is divided.
15
  As expected, 
legislative fractionalization is positively related to budget surpluses when government is divided, 
and it has no discernible impact when government is unified.   
 In addition to being statistically significant, the conditional effects of unified government 
and legislative fractionalization on budget balances are substantively important.  When 
legislative fractionalization is held at its minimum, moving from divided to unified government 
improves the budget balance, on average, by more than one standard deviation, about 3.5 
percentage points.  Likewise, under conditions of divided government, moving from a single 
party to a perfectly fractionalized legislature produces an improvement in budget balances of 
well above one standard deviation or about 4.7 percentage points. 
Insert Figure 2 
 I estimate the primary model with the Party Decentralization variable in Model 5.  The 
primary results largely hold up, although the Divided Government High Fractionalization 
dummy falls just below significance.  It is interesting also to note that the party decentralization 
variable is strongly significant in the expected direction, providing evidence consistent with 
Hallerberg and Marier (2004) that systems with more decentralized parties tend to run higher 
deficits. 
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 Each of these effects is linear, such that the effect of a half unit change in legislative fragmentation on budget 
surpluses for unified versus divided government is half of the coefficient.  The lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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 The final two models in Table 3 include the two variables controlling for presidential 
versus legislative budget powers in different systems – Wehner’s Legislative Budget Power and 
Cheibub’s Presidential Dominance.  The inclusion of each of these variables reduces the number 
of observations significantly, but the primary results still largely hold.  It is also interesting to 
note that both variables are strongly significant in the expected directions, suggesting that 
countries with more powerful legislatures do tend to have more budget deficits. 
 Turning now to Table 4, Model 8 presents the primary model without the economic 
control variables that include GDP in their calculations.  The purpose here is to avoid any 
endogeneity with the dependent variable, and it is clear that the results continue to hold.  Model 
9 makes use of Budgbal, the operationalization of the dependent variable used by Cheibub 
(2006) and taken solely from the World Bank.  While this model drops more than 200 
observations, the results largely hold, especially for Divided Government High Fractionalization.   
Insert Table 4 
Models 10 and 11 present analyses patterned after the primary model (Model 1), but 
considering only those country-years that meet certain conditions. The first of these models is 
limited to those democracies characterized by powerful legislatures, defined as those scoring 
above a “0” on Wehner’s Legislative Budgetary Power scale.  The logic here is that, when 
presidents are completely dominant in the budgetary process, legislative-executive relations are 
unlikely to matter.  The second model is limited to democracies with centralized parties, defined 
as those country-years coded “0” for Party Decentralization.  I set this condition because, as 
discussed above, the theory depends on the existence of meaningful political parties.   
The results of Model 10 are significantly strengthened by the exclusion of systems with 
weak legislatures; this finding is not unexpected given that the theory assumes the importance of 
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both executive and legislature in the budgetary process.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, the 
results of Model 11 are weaker than those of the primary model, with both variables approaching 
standard levels of significance but not quite achieving them.  This result may simply be due to 
the numerous observations dropped by the model, or it may reflect the fact that parties continue 
to matter even in systems (like the United States) where they are relatively decentralized. 
In Model 12, I make use of the two alternative operationalizations of my primary 
variables – Unified Government 2 and Divided Government High Fractionalization 2 – both of 
which are computed from Henisz (2003).  Strikingly, despite the low correlation between these 
variables and those used in the primary models, the results hold to a high level of significance.  It 
is interesting, however, that the Divided Government High Fractionalization variable is 
predicted to have a greater impact on the budget balance in these models.
16
 
The control variables in each of the models are largely as anticipated.  Leftist 
governments are found to run larger surpluses in one of the models, but otherwise ideology does 
not seem to be a major predictor of fiscal performance.  This finding supports Hahm, Kamlet, 
and Mowery (1996), who find that governing ideology is unrelated to fiscal discipline.  The 
Government Consumption / GDP variable is significantly related to budgetary outcomes in only 
one of the models, indicating that larger governments may be more likely to run deficits but that 
government size is not the most important factor in overspending.  The Plurality Electoral 
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 To ensure that my findings are not driven by any one part of the world, I also estimate the primary model after 
dropping each of the world regions (not shown here for space reasons), and the results are largely unchanged.  Both 
variables remain significant throughout, with the only exception that Divided Government High Fractionalization 
drops slightly below significance when South American countries (the plurality of my dataset) are excluded.  Note 
also that I estimate a model using a third operationalization of the primary variables.  This one also derives from 
Henisz (2003) and is computed by comparing the name of the ruling executive party with the name of the primary 
party in the legislature.  If those names match, and if the legislative party controls a majority of seats, I code the 
variable “1”.  Models using this operationalization produce results in the expected direction for both variables, with 
Divided Government High Fractionalization just shy of statistical significance and Unified Government not 
significant.  Running the same model using fixed effects, however, raises the first of the variables to strong 
significance and the second to a p-value of .103. 
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System variable is associated with deficits in three of the models, a finding which is consistent 
with the association in prior work of proportional representation with balanced budgets.  
Somewhat strangely, Logged GDP per capita is in the expected, positive direction in one 
model, in the negative direction in another, and it does not seem to have any impact in most of 
the models.  This result may be related to the fact that nearly all of the world’s presidential 
systems are in developing countries, and so development level may not be a significant driver in 
this dataset (and note that the variable is important and strongly significant in the pooled models, 
which include more OECD countries).  Not surprisingly, the variable Δ GDP is positive and 
strongly significant in nearly all the models, suggesting that countries experiencing recession are 
more likely to engage in deficit spending.  Likewise, Election Year is positive and significant, 
likely picking up on the efforts of governments to balance their finances after the overspending 
that can occur in an election year; this result provides strong support for the political-business 
cycle.
17
  The variable Δ Exchange Rate is also an important determinant of the budget balance, 
with budget surpluses more likely in periods of currency depreciation.  This relationship is likely 
due to the declining debt burden faced by governments in such circumstances.  Finally, and 
unexpectedly, countries with a higher percentage of their populations over the age of 64 are less 
likely to run a budget deficit.  This finding may result from the fact that government social 
insurance schemes for the elderly are not fully developed in most parts of the world, and so 
having a larger elderly population may not be the fiscal burden in many places that it is in 
Europe.  In addition, countries with a younger population may be obliged to spend more on 
education than those which are graying.   
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 It is also interesting to note that there is considerably less evidence for a political-business cycle among the 
parliamentary systems included in Model 14.  Given the lack of a fixed timetable for parliamentary elections, this 
result makes sense.  Governments in parliamentary systems can simply call elections in good economic times rather 
than having to create employment growth with fiscal policy. 
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I conclude my quantitative analysis with one model (Model 13) that includes both 
presidential and parliamentary democracies, and another (Model 14) that examines only 
parliamentary democracies.  My purpose in estimating these models is to reproduce the original 
fragmentation-deficit finding from the literature (which typically pools presidential and 
parliamentary regimes but which I argue is more appropriate for parliamentary regimes alone) 
and to test whether presidentialism itself has any impact on budgetary balances.  I make use of 
fixed effects for these models because that approach is the most common one in the previous 
literature.   
I include a Presidential Government dummy in Model 13, which pools both systems, to 
test the impact of government form on the budget balance.  This variable is drawn from the 
“system” variable of Beck et al. (2001), the same variable use to restrict the previous models to 
only presidential systems.  In addition, I use the same Unified Government variable as before to 
test the prior literature’s link between low fragmentation and fiscal responsibility.  For 
parliamentary systems, this variable measures whether the prime minister’s party controls a 
majority of seats in parliament (as is generally the case in Westminster systems), while in 
presidential systems it measures (as we have seen) whether the president’s party controls a 
majority in the legislature.   As a result, the variable picks up well on the underlying concept of 
single party dominance overcoming the common pooled resource and veto player problems 
inherent in the budget process.  
Looking first at Model 13, my results indicate that there is no statistically significant 
difference in budget balances between presidential and parliamentary democracies.  This result 
seems to contrast with Cheibub (2006) and Franzese (2002) and to support Persson and Tabellini 
(2003), although my focus in this article is not on estimating the impact of parliamentary versus 
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presidential government. Interestingly, however, the Unified Government variable is in the 
expected direction and strongly significant, as has been found in the prior literature.  It is worth 
asking, however, whether that finding is attributable to both the parliamentary and presidential 
systems included in the model.  Model 14 considers only parliamentary systems, and in this 
operationalization, Unified Government (which now only measures whether the prime minister’s 
party controls a majority of seats in parliament) loses statistical significance, but only slightly.  
This finding provides some support that the logic of the prior literature holds for parliamentary 
systems alone.  That said, when legislative fractionalization is considered in this model 
separately from unified government (not shown here for space reasons), there is mixed evidence 
that it can sometimes improve budget balances, something not anticipated in prior research.  As a 
result, it appears that the prior literature may be basically correct but incomplete in its 
characterization of parliamentary systems.  It may well be, for example, that a curvilinear 
relationship exists between party fragmentation and budget balances, perhaps because high 
fragmentation parliamentary systems are more likely to use fiscal pacts (see Hallerberg 2004).  A 
more complete study of parliamentary systems would be beyond the scope of this project, but 
future research will hopefully delve more deeply into the parliamentary budget process to further 
refine the arguments that have gone before.   
 
Conclusions 
 The insights generated by prior studies on the political economy of deficit spending are 
impressive but incomplete.  Theories identifying a causal relationship between political 
fragmentation and budget deficits, the primary insight of the literature, are largely based on the 
logic of parliamentary democracy.  In presidential systems, where an independently elected head 
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of state dominates the executive, a linear connection between legislative or government 
fragmentation and overspending seems unlikely. 
 For that reason, I develop in this article the first theory (to my knowledge) linking 
political fragmentation with budget deficits specifically for presidential institutions.  I argue that 
presidential democracies should be better able to balance their budgets when government is 
unified than when it is divided.  Furthermore, I contend that, when government is divided, 
greater party fragmentation in the assembly will facilitate fiscal responsibility by empowering 
the elected president.  I test this theory with a dataset of all presidential democracies from 1976 
to 2007 contingent of data availability.  The results provide solid evidence for my contentions 
and even indicate that the effects of legislative fragmentation under conditions of divided 
presidential government are greater than expected.  They also help pull developing countries and 
diverse democratic institutions into a literature that has centered on explaining the behavior of 
wealthy, parliamentary systems.   
 Perhaps more significantly, however, the project underlines the wisdom of considering 
presidential systems separately when seeking to understand the role of legislative institutions in 
policy outcomes.  While our understanding of the role of party fragmentation has developed 
most fully in the budgetary politics literature, there is evidence in prior research that highly 
divided party systems can matter in other arenas as well.  For in example, Haggard and Kaufman 
(1995) associate party fragmentation with an impaired ability to engage in economic reform.  
Similarly, Ehrlich (2007) finds that such fragmentation is associated with trade protection cross-
nationally, and Mukherjee (2003) links it with a growth in the provision of private versus public 
goods.  The logic underlying all of these arguments is similar to the one identified in the budget 
literature, and for that reason it seems likely that the unique separation of executive and 
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legislative power in presidential systems should be taken into account in considering these policy 
arenas as well.   
 Finally, within the literature on presidential democracy itself, the project forces a 
reconsideration of which types are institutional arrangements produce the most desired 
outcomes.  Traditionally, scholars of presidentialism have followed Mainwaring (1993) in seeing 
legislative fragmentation as undesirable, something that makes presidential regimes more prone 
to breakdown and a variety of other ills.  If my argument is to be believed, however, 
fragmentation is only problematic for good policy-making insofar as it produces consistently 
divided government.  Once government is divided, however, fragmentation can actually 
contribute to the provision of public goods.  Whether this relationship holds for Mainwaring’s 
primary concern – regime breakdown – has yet to be determined, but there is at least reason to 
believe that it should hold in a wide variety of policy areas.  For that reason, future research 
could usefully examine how party fragmentation and divided government interact in presidential 
democracies to influence many of those countries’ most important decisions. 
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Table 1: Country-Years included in the Primary Model (by region, only democratic and 
presidential country years with available data included) 
 
United States, 1978-2006; Haiti 1995-1999; Dominican Republic, 1979-2007; Mexico 1998-
2000; Guatemala, 1997-2006; Honduras, 1983-2007; El Salvador, 1985-2007; Nicaragua, 1991-
2007; Costa Rica, 1976-2007; Panama, 1991-2001; Colombia, 1976-2003; Venezuela, 1976-
2005; Guyana, 1993-1997; Ecuador, 1981-2000; Peru, 1982-1992, 2002-2007; Brazil, 1986-
2007; Bolivia, 1986-2007; Paraguay, 1993-2007; Chile, 1991-2007; Argentina, 1988-2004; 
Uruguay, 1986-2007 
 
Poland, 1995-2007; Hungary, 1991; Croatia, 2001; Cyprus, 1978-2000; Bulgaria, 1993-2002; 
Moldova, 1997-2007; Estonia, 1995-2007; Lithuania, 1994-2007; Ukraine, 2000-2007; Georgia, 
2005-2007 
 
Gambia, 1978-1982, 1990-1993; Mali, 1994-2003; Senegal, 2001; Niger, 2006; Ghana, 1981, 
2002-2007; Kenya 2003-2007; Zambia, 1992-1996; South Africa, 1995-2007; Namibia, 1992-
2007; Madagascar, 1994-2007; Lebanon, 2006-2007; Israel, 1998-2007 
 
Mongolia, 1994-2007; South Korea, 1989-2007; Sri Lanka, 2002-2003, 2007; Philippines, 1989-
2007; Indonesia, 2000-2007 
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 Table 2:  Summary Statistics  
Variable How Computed 
 
 Mean Range  St. 
Dev. 
Expectations 
(Y=Budget 
Surplus/GDP) 
Budget Balance/GDP Total National Budget Balance divided by GDP 
X 100 (Source: World Bank 2008, IMF 2011, 
IMF 2006) 
-1.86 -18.5 to 19.8 3.35 N/A 
Budgbal Total National Budget Balance divided by GDP 
X 100 (Source: Cheibub 2006) 
-2.19 -16.1 to 5.48 3.17 N/A 
Unified Government “1” when party of president controls all relevant 
legislative houses (Lagged) (Source: Beck et al. 
2001) 
.432 Dummy .496 Positive  
Divided Government High 
Fractionalization 
“1” when Unified Government is 0 and 
Legislative Fractionalization is greater than .67 
(Lagged)  
.339 Dummy .474 Positive 
Legislative Fractionalization 
 
Probability that any two lower house legislators 
come from different parties (Lagged)  (Source: 
Beck et al. 2001) 
.622 0 to .928 .162 Positive (as part 
of interaction) 
Unified Government X 
Legislative Fractionalization 
Interaction of Unified Government and 
Legislative Fractionalization (Lagged) 
.229 0 to .879 .283 Negative  
Leftist Government “1” when government is leftist  (Lagged) 
(Source: Beck et al. 2001) 
.278 Dummy .448 Negative 
Govt Consumption / GDP Government Consumption divided by GDP X 
100 (Lagged)  (Source: World Bank 2008) 
14.1 2.90 to 46.0 5.64 Negative 
Δ GDP Annual percentage change in GDP (Lagged) 
(Source: World Bank 2008) 
3.51 -16.2 to 18.3 4.02 Positive 
Pop over 64 Percent of population over 64 years old 
(Lagged)  (Source: World Bank 2008) 
6.51 2.66 to 16.8 3.78 Negative 
Plurality Electoral System “1” when lower house electoral system is 
plurality (Lagged) (Source: Beck et al. 2001) 
.478 
 
Dummy .500 Negative 
Logged GDP per capita Natural log of Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (Lagged) (Source: World Bank 2008) 
7.72 5.34 to 10.5 1.15 Positive 
Election Year “1” when election year (Lagged)  (Source: Beck 
et al. 2001) 
.254 Dummy .435 Positive 
 
Δ Exchange Rate 
 
Annual percentage change in exchange rate 
with the US Dollar (Lagged) (Source: World 
Bank 2008) 
.885 -.282 to 139 7.02 Ambiguous 
Presidential Dominance  Measure of presidential dominance over 
budgets (Lagged)  (Source: Cheibub 2006) 
.654 Dummy .476 Positive 
Legislative Budget Power Measure of legislative control over budgets 
(Lagged)  (Source: Wehner 2010) 
.563 0 to 1 .330 Negative 
Party  
Decentralization  
“2” = free candidate access to ballot 
(Lagged) (Source: Hankla 2006) 
.501 0,1,2 .748 Negative 
Unified Government 2 “1” when party of president controls all relevant 
legislative houses (Lagged) (Source: computed 
from Henisz 2003) 
.755 Dummy .430 Positive  
Divided Government High 
Fractionalization 2 
“1” when Unified Government 2 is 0 and 
Legislative Fractionalization (taken from 
Henisz 2003) is greater than .67 (Lagged)  
.124 Dummy .330 Positive 
Presidential Government  “1” = Presidential System (Lagged) (Source: 
Beck et al. 2001) 
.444 Dummy .497 Positive 
(used in pooled 
models) 
Regional Dummies Series of dummies for each world region N/A N/A N/A Included in all 
non-fixed 
effects models 
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Table 3 
Dependent Variable = Budget Surplus/GDP 
Variable Model 1 
 (N=623) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 2 
(N=623) 
Robust 
Regression 
Model 3 
(N=623) 
Fixed 
Effects 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 4  
(N=623) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 5 
(N=563) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 6 
(N=382) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 7 
(N=376) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
.380*** 
(.070) 
.659*** 
(.017) 
.233*** 
(.033) 
.373*** 
(.069) 
.340*** 
(.074) 
.272*** 
(.086) 
.285*** 
(.086) 
Divided Government High 
Fractionalization  
.896*** 
(.331) 
.532*** 
(.195) 
.605¹ 
(.403) 
 .558² 
(.381) 
.834³ 
(.550) 
1.09* 
(.575) 
Unified Government .879*** 
(.264) 
.487** 
(.191) 
.699* 
(.367) 
3.53*** 
(.944) 
.664** 
(.308) 
.947** 
(.454) 
.675* 
(.353) 
Unified Government  X 
Legislative 
Fractionalization 
   -4.56*** 
(1.56) 
   
Legislative 
Fractionalization 
   4.67*** 
(1.17) 
   
Party Decentralization 
 
    -.530*** 
(.125) 
  
Leftist Government 
 
.110 
(.279) 
-.023 
(.171) 
.429 
(.359) 
069 
(.262) 
.230 
(.283) 
.742* 
(.380) 
.220 
(.351) 
Government Consumption 
/ GDP 
-.013 
(.035) 
-.027* 
(.016) 
-.051 
(.037) 
-.015 
(.034) 
-.021 
(.035) 
-.020 
(.060) 
-.043 
(.062) 
Δ GDP 
 
.078*** 
(.027) 
.029* 
(.018) 
.058* 
(.030) 
.075*** 
(.026) 
.060** 
(.026) 
.035 
(.039) 
.061* 
(.034) 
Pop over 64 .104** 
(.047) 
.031 
(.035) 
.804*** 
(.272) 
.106** 
(.046) 
.111** 
(.053) 
.183** 
(.080) 
-.034 
(.061) 
Plurality Electoral System -.204 
(.281) 
-.220 
(.128) 
-2.66** 
(1.21) 
-.198 
(.267) 
-.063 
(.327) 
-.894* 
(.478) 
-.323 
(.513) 
Logged GDP per capita -.049 
(.126) 
.050 
(.088) 
-.856 
(1.17) 
-.002 
(.127) 
-.067 
(.130) 
-.071 
(.233) 
.611** 
(.295) 
Election Year .608** 
(.244) 
.335** 
(.157) 
.587** 
(.252) 
.636*** 
(.245) 
.502** 
(.239) 
.491 
(.348) 
.442 
(.321) 
Δ Exchange Rate .123*** 
(.029) 
.236*** 
(.011) 
.095*** 
(.018) 
.123*** 
(.029) 
.113*** 
(.026) 
.095*** 
(.028) 
.107*** 
(.028) 
Presidential Dominance 
(Cheibub) 
      .878** 
(.432) 
Legislative Budget Power 
(Wehner) 
     -1.43** 
(.650) 
 
R^2 .309 N/A .040 .314 .295 .280 .273 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ¹p=.134, ²p=.143, ³p=.129.  All tests are 2-tailed.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Table 4 
Dependent Variable = Budget Surplus/GDP unless otherwise stated   
Variable Model 8  
(N=636) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 9 
Y= 
Budgbal 
 (N=415) 
PCSE 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 10 
(N=345) 
Pres 
Systems 
with 
Powerful 
Legislatures 
Model 11 
(N=476) 
Pres 
Systems 
with 
Centralized 
Parties 
Model 12 
 (N=592) 
All Pres 
Systems 
Model 13 
 (N=1424) 
Fixed 
Effects 
All 
Systems 
Model 14 
(N=791) 
Fixed 
Effects 
All Parl 
Systems 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
.331*** 
(.057) 
.524*** 
(.079) 
.229*** 
(.086) 
.297*** 
(.078) 
.372*** 
(.071) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
 .0003 
(.0002) 
Divided Govt High 
Fractionalization 
.858*** 
(.332) 
.741** 
(.309) 
1.36** 
(.561) 
.489² 
(.448) 
   
Unified Government .985*** 
(.269) 
.657¹ 
(.408) 
1.39*** 
(.439) 
.639³ 
(.402) 
 .771*** 
(.277) 
.674
4
 
(.482) 
Divided Government 
High Fractionalization 2 
    1.09** 
(.436) 
  
Unified Government 2 
 
    .507** 
(.245) 
  
Presidential Government 
 
     -.855 
(.878) 
 
Leftist Government 
 
.152 
(.250) 
.210 
(.328) 
.603 
(.381) 
.130 
(.298) 
.304 
(.283) 
.657*** 
(.229) 
.580** 
(.293) 
Government 
Consumption / GDP 
 .023 
(.032) 
.039 
(.054) 
-.009 
(.037) 
-.031 
(.036) 
-.230*** 
(.035) 
-.470*** 
(.073) 
Δ GDP 
 
 .017 
(.036) 
.048 
(.041) 
.051* 
(.027) 
.057** 
(.026) 
.066** 
(.027) 
.088* 
(.047) 
Pop over 64 .093*** 
(.035) 
.133* 
(.072) 
.141* 
(.080) 
.084 
(.063) 
.087* 
(.050) 
.579*** 
(.146) 
.527*** 
(.173) 
Plurality Electoral System -.106 
(.261) 
-.504 
(.352) 
-1.30*** 
(.497) 
.340 
(.365) 
-.064 
(.301) 
-1.45 
(1.10) 
5.39** 
(2.11) 
Logged GDP per capita  -.429** 
(.208) 
.098 
(.235) 
.155 
(.129) 
-.070 
(.138) 
4.84*** 
(.638) 
6.58*** 
(.773) 
Election Year .626*** 
(.242) 
.456** 
(.228) 
.576 
(.377) 
.521* 
(.298) 
.496** 
(.243) 
.286 
(.191) 
.133 
(.264) 
Logged Δ Exchange Rate .100*** 
(.026) 
.099*** 
(.031) 
.079*** 
(.030) 
.102*** 
(.027) 
.125*** 
(.023) 
.045** 
(.019) 
1.60*** 
(.553) 
R^2 .271 .433 .284 .259 .289 .004 .005 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ¹p=.108, ²p=.275, ³p=.112, 
4
p=.162.  All tests are 2-tailed.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Figure 2 
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